Last week, a relative's bank account was drained. In this case a person presented some checks, in person, to a teller at the bank. The teller performed a fraud check by calling the telephone number on record for the account. The person who answered the telephone confirmed the checks were valid. Then the bank cashed the checks. Disturbing? Commonplace!
I spend a lot of time working on computer security for my day job. We spend great amounts of time on threat analysis, process control, fault detection. The world isn't very far along with respect to full protection.
So, let's dig into a particular sequence of events that likely happened here:
- Someone was able to gain access to the eMail account for the relative
- Next, they examined the eMail history (e.g for bank account #)
- Next, they requested a password reset for the bank account (sent to the email)
- Now, with access to the bank account, they:
- Examined signature on some of the online facsimiles of recently cashed checks
- Altered the contact telephone number for the bank account
- Deleted any account-changed evidence that was emailed to the relative
- Next, they prepared a counter check (readily available) and went to the bank
- The banker called the fake number and approved the transaction
Yes, the bank will accept liability and will (eventually) return the money. However, this scenario isn't quite like credit-card fraud. Here is a case where your real bank account has no money, you are stuck until the bank restores the funds (after their additional check to make sure you aren't part of the ring!)
Mobile phone eMail Weak Link
The break-in got me to re-visiting my assumptions about eMail and if there is any way to improve eMail password recovery plumbing. How good are eMail provider's MFA solutions? How big is the risk when MFA tokens and email might be on the same phone? How easy is it to social engineer a password recovery? Two cases in point:
Yahoo eMail
- Has a multi-factor solution that binds a special code to a particular system
- However, allows for a single password that binds to a mobile device
- Allows for SMS or alternate eMail address for password recovery
So, one solution is to not have an SMS recovery for Yahoo and then to have the recovery email to another service (say gmail).
Note, even though SMS target can be removed for Yahoo, they really want an SMS target, they will re-ask for one during recovery even if you only want to use recovery email. So, be careful letting an SMS recovery leak back in to your configuration.
Google eMail
- Has a time based token option for 2nd factor
- This does NOT work when using an embedded email system (like on a phone)
- Has a fancy password recovery mechanism that may be a little too fancy
- Seems to ignore registered SMS as recovery option
Also, here again, if both Yahoo and gmail are on the same phone, it is possible to recover both (again, hope your phone's lock system is robust)
What Next?
I'll discuss malware proxy risks in a future posting. In the mean time, need to investigate which financial institutions allow for:
- Requiring token based MFA
- Have non-email based password recovery schemes
- Optionally, restrict remote financial transactions to non-internet
- Or, allow for voice confirmed shared secrets ("what is the answer to question 2?")
Yes, the convenience of just typing in a password should be a thing of the past. But, even an MFA solution, or alternate channel password recovery doesn't seem to close all the gaps.